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Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets
ABSTRACT
Compared to an average Fortune 500 firm, a target of a
hostile takeover is smaller, older, has a lower Tobin's Q,
invests less of its income, and is growing more slowly. The low
Q seems to be an industry-specific rather than a firm-specific
effect. In addition, a hostile target is less likely to be run
by a member of the founding family, and has Tower officer
ownership, than the average firm. In contrast, a target of a
friendly acquisitions is smaller and younger than an average
Fortune 500 firm, and has comparable Tobin's Qs and most other
financial characteristics. Friendly targets are more likely to
be run by a member o the foUnding family, and have higher
officer ownership, than the average firm. The decision of a CEO
with a large stake and/or with a relationship to a founder to
retire often precipitates a friendly acquisition.
These results suggest that the motive for a takeover often
determines its mood. Thus disciplinary takeovers are more often
hostile, and synergistic ones are more often friendly.
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CANADAEconomic analysis has identified two broad classes of takeovers. The
first is what we call disciplinary takeovers, the purpose of which seems to
be to correct non-value-maximizing (NVM) practices of managers of the target
firms. Suchpractices might include excessive growth and diversification,
lavish consumptionof perquisites, overpayment to employees and suppliers, or
debt-avoidanceto secure a quiet life. Disciplinary takeovers thus address
the problem of what Williamson (1.965) has called discretionary behavior by
managers, and Jensen (1986) has christened "free cash flows."Because
disciplinary takeovers are designed to replace or change the policies of
managers who do not maximize shareholder value, the actual merger of the two
firms is not really essential. The takeover is only the most effectiveway
to change control and with it the target's operating strategy.
The second class of takeovers can be loosely called synergistic, since
the motivating force behind them is the possibility of benefits from
combining the businesses of two finns. Synergy gains can come from increases
in market power, from offsetting profits of one firm with tax loss
carryforwards of the other, from combining R & D labs or marketing networks,
or from simply eliminating functions that are common to the two firms. The
combination of the two businesses is thus essential for realizing the gains
in synergistic takeovers.
It is important to note from the start that the gains in synergistic
takeovers could well be gains for the managers as much as for shareholders.
For example, when managers launch diversification programs, they may be
creating no value for shareholders, but only satisfying their own preferences
for growth. The point nonetheless remains that the acquiror is seeking a2
combination of the operations or cash flows of the two firms and not an
improvement of the target. This would not be the case in disciplinary
takeovers.
This paper attempts to verify the conjecture that disciplinary takeovers
are more often hostile, and synergistic takeovers are more often friendly.
We assemble evidence showing that targets of hostile and friendly bids have
ownership and asset characteristics that one would expect of the targets of
disciplinary and synergistic takeovers, respectively. We interpret this
evidence as showing that, at least to some extent, the motive for a takeover
determines its mood.
The claim that hostility and friendliness typically reflect two
different takeover motives is by no means clearcut. Some diversification-
motivated takeovers undoubtedly run into resistance from managers of target
firms, who are unhappy either with expected changes in operations or with the
compensation they get for giving up control. Similarly, some takeovers
launched in order to change the target's operating strategy proceed with the
consent of target managers who obtain lucrative enough rewards to give up
control peacefully, or else simply want to retire. These grey areas suggest
the possibility that the variation in the monetary incentives of managers
across target firms can completely account for mood differences from
acquisition to acquisition. Walkling and Long (1984) appear to take this
view. In contrast, we show that there are numerous characteristics, in
addition to measures of financial incentives of their managers, that differ
across hostile and friendly targets. Moreover, these are the differences one
would expect to find between targets of disciplinary and of synergistic
takeovers.3
The analysis of this paper is based on the sample of all publicly traded
Fortune 500 firmsasof 1980. Of the 454 firms in the sample, 82 have been
acquiredby third partiesor went through a management buyout (MBO) inthe
period1981-1985.Based on an examination of the Wall Street Journal Index,
40 of those appear to have started hostile and 42 friendly. We call an
acquisition hostile if the initial bid for the target (which need not be a
bid from the eventual acquiror) was neither negotiated with its board prior
to being made nor accepted by the board as made. Thus initial rejection by
the target's board is taken as evidence of the bidder's hostility, as is
active management resistance to the bid, escape to a white knight, or a
management buyout in response to unsolicited pressure. We sort acquisitions
on the basis of the initial mood because we are interested in the source of
the takeover gains that sparked the bidding in the first place. Targets that
are not classified as hostile are called friendly.
The remaining sections of the paper etamine ownership and financial
characteristics of our Fortune 500 sample. Section 2 focuses on the
ownership characteristics of friendly and hostile targets. Friendly targets
appear to have much higher board ownership than either hostile targets or the
rest of the sample, and in particular much higher ownership by the top
officers. Compared to an average firm in the sample, a friendly target is
much more likely, and a hostile target much less likely, to be run by a
founder or a member of the founder's family. Furthermore, the probability of
an acquisition, and particularly of a friendly acquisition, rises with
management ownership. In fact, intentional exit of the founding family or of
a CEO with a very large stake is a frequent impetus for a friendly
acquisition in our sample. Although the results on ownership identify some4
clear differences between hostile and friendly targets, they do not suggest a
clear link between the motive for a takeover and its mood.
Section 3 examines the asset and performance characteristics of the
sample. The results suggest that targets of friendly acquisitions have
comparable Tobin's Qs to those of non-targets, but that hostile targets have
lower Qs. Hostile targets not only have low Qs within their industries but
are concentrated in low Q industries. Friendly targets are younger and faster
growing than hostile targets and are basically indistinguishable from the
sample as awhole in tens of performance variables.
These results are the basic evidence consistent with our conjecture that
synergistic takeovers are more likely to be friendly anddisciplinary
takeovers are more likely to be hostile. Hostile targets appear to bepoorly
performingfirms, as we would expect of candidates for disciplinary
takeovers. In contrast, it seems less likely that match-specific attractions
of synergistic targets would be easily captured by basic performance
measures.
Section4 presents probits of the effects of firm characteristicson the
probabilityof its hostile or friendly acquisition. The results confirm that
a firm with a low market value relative to the amount of fixed assets it
holds is more likely to become a hostile target than the average firm. This
appears to be accounted for by an industry effect, and not by a particularly
low valuation within an industry. Controlling for size, top officer
ownership and Q, we find that the presence of the founding family reduces the
likelihood of hostile bids, but does not raise that of friendly bids. Large
management stakes, on the other hand, do more to encourage friendly
acquisitions than to discourage hostile ones.5
Section 5 takes a separate look at management buyouts. These deals
deserve special attention because they cannot be motivated by synergistic
gains. We define hostile MBOs as deals done in response to a third party bid
or 13-D filing with an expression of intent to seek control. Friendly NEOs
then are transactions in which such pressure is not apparent. Because our
sampleof MBOs is quite small, accurate statistical inference is impossible
and all we do is eyeball the data. Except for the fact that leveraged
buyouts are, on average,much smaller transactions, differences between
friendlyand hostile MBOs largely mimic the differences between friendly and
hostile acquisitions more generally. The external pressure that prompts
defensiveMBOs seems likely to be an attempt to discipline the management.
Friendly MZOs, however, seem more likely to be done for tax reasons or
possibly to buy undervalued shares.
We interpret this study as furnishing some evidence consistent with the
view that hostile and friendly targets are very different types of companies.
Whiletargets of friendly bids appear to be a wide range of firms in many
industries, hostile targetsare usually older, slowly growing firi,is that are
valued much belowthe replacement cost of their tangible assets. Friendly
acquisitionscould be motivated by corporate diversification, synergies, and,
as our results suggest, life cycle decisions of a founder or a manager with a
dominant stake. Bidders in hostile transactions may be more interested in
shutting down, selling off, or redepreciating the physical capital of the
target, than they are in continuing business as usual. In addition to
possible heterogeneity of financial incentives, resistance to takeovers may
be related to the unwillingness of target management to accept the particular
changes sought by the bidder, and often lead it to seek a white knight or an6
1(30.In short, the evidence is consistent with our notion that the source of
gains from a takeover can determine its mood.
2. Ownership Structure and Acquisitions.
In this Section, we present ownership characteristics of 1980 Fortune
500 firms that were acquired in the subsequent five years. Recent empirical
research (Demsetz and latin, 1985, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) has
documented the incidence of substantial managerial ownership of large
industrial corporations. These studies have not, however, focused on the
ownership structure of acquisition targets, which is the task of this
section. Evidence on ownership enables us to see whether managers of non-
targets, hostile targets, and friendly targets have different financial
interests in an acquisition.
Therelationship between management ownership and the takeover mood has
been previously examined by Walkling and Long (1984). who found managers
personalwealth changes from a successful acquisition to be negatively
related to the decision to resist. In our analysis, we also consider the
impact of management ownership on the probability of an acquisition, be it
hostile or friendly, as well as the influence of the presence of a founding
family and of the chairman of the board's age on the probability of either a
hostile or a friendly acquisition. In this way, we hope to obtain a more
complete picture of the function of managers' financial incentives in
takeovers.
Throughout thisanalysis,wetrytoavoid sample selection problems and
tothis end begin with all publicly traded 1980 Fortune 500 firms (Walkling
and Long might have had some sample selection problems since they report7
implausibly high initial stakes of acquirors -- 11and 27 percent for
contested and uncdntested offers, respectively). Also, since we are
interested in differences between firms, we try to get away from cyclical
variationand compare all firms as of 1980. In the case of ownership, data
come from the 1980 Corporate Data Exchange directory, which contains data on
ownershippositions of board members as well as large outside shareholders.
We do not have data on executive compensation, or on the ownership positions
taking the form of options; many studies (e.g., Murphy, 1985) indicate that
executive wealth changes from stock ownership are large relative to those
from other sources.
The first measure of ownership we use is the combined percentage stake
ofthe board of directors. Because of the nature of CDEreporting, the
stakesare addedupover onlythose board members whose positions exceed .2%.
This may lead to some problems for the largest firms, where even the tiniest
percentage ownership positions are worth millions of dollars.
To the extent that the board makes the decision as to whether to resist
an offer, the board's stake may be the appropriate measure of financial
incentives.In addition to this measure, we divide the board ownership into
that of the top twoofficersand that of the rest of the board. The first
capturesthe interest of the top officers whose concern for the outcome of a
bid might go well beyond their personal capital gain, and the second captures
the interest of important decision-makers who might care little about the
outcome of a bid except for their personal financial gain. These two
measures complement the board's stake in that they reflect the pecuniary gain
of the two constituencies on the board with possibly different attitudes to
the acquisition.8
Other personal characteristics of the management team might influence
their attitude to being acquired independent of their ownership stake.
First, top officers who are founders or members of the founding family might
playa special rote in the company, either because they command the loyalty
of shareholders and employees, or because their attachment to the company is
more than just financial. For this reason, it seemed useful to ask which
fraction of friendly and hostile takeover targets were run by a member of the
founding family. This is of particular interest in the context of executive
succession, since sale of the company might be a natural, means for a
founder's retirement. For a similar reason, we are interested in the age of
the chairman, since his retirement plans might influence his attitude toward
the sale of his company.
Recall that an acquisition is called hostile if it was not negotiated
prior to the initial bid, was not accepted by the board from the start, or
was contested by the target management in any way. This category thus
includes acquisitions by white knights. It also includes management buyouts
that were precipitated by a bid or a 13-D filing expressing the intent to
acquire control, since such pressure is clearly hostile (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986). Our calling a target hostile whenever there is any evidence of the
board's rejection of the initial offer may misclassify as hostile some
situations in which the board is only attempting to obtain a higher bid.
Because there are only three transactions in our sample where resistance was
limited simply to a rejection of the first offer, we proceed using this
classification. Also, our classification records a transaction as friendly
either if there is no evidence of resistance from the target management to
the first prospective acquiror or if the management implemented an 1430 and we9
have no evidence of a hostile threat. Again, the classification is far from
perfect given that target management mayhavebeen coerced into going along
in the face of imminent defeat.
Although Section 5 presents some evidence to the effect that it is
appropriate to include hostile and friendly 2(BOs into the general samples of
hostile and friendly transactions, we trytobe cautious and present many of
the results both including and excluding }tBOsfromthe samples of targets.
Unless specifically noted, our discussion will concern the results for the
case where management buyouts are included.
Table LA presents the means and medians of various ownership variables
for different groups of companies, and Table lB gives t-statistics for tests
of the differences of means between these groups. In the whole sample, the
board of directors owns on average 10.9% of the company; 6.3% is theaverage
stake of the top two officers and 4.5% is the average stake of the rest of
the board. Not surprisingly, ownership positions are skewed to the right:
the medians for the above three measures are 3.54%, .61% and 1.09%
respectively. Onewayto describe the magnitude of these stakes is that the
average value of the top officers' position is $40.5 million and the median
is $2.26 million. Almost a quarter of the companies in the sample are runby
members of the founding families, and the average chairman of the board is a
youthful 58 years old.
From the viewpoint of ownership, friendly targets are very different
both from the sample and from hostile targets. Boards of friendly targets
ownover20% of the company, on average, which is statistically significantly
higher than either the 10.9% average board ownership in the sample,orthe
8.3% average of hostile targets. Hostile targets have on average lower boardTABLE is: Characteristics of Top Management By Acquisition Type
Friendly Hostile
SarleFriendlyHostile Non-MED Non-MBO
Founding Family Mean .244 .405 .100 .412 .0938
Present on Top
Management Team —1Median 0 0 0 0 0
Fractional Equity Mean .109 .208 .0829 .136 .0874
Ownership By The
Board of DirectorsMedian .0354 .135 .0418 .0894 .0382
Fractional Equity Mean .0635 .145 .0318 .1.39 .0364
Ownership By Top
Two Officers Median .0061 .0176 .0049 .0139 .0044
Fractional EquityMean .0455 .0625 .0512 .0464 .0510
Ownership By The
Rest of the BoardMedian .0109 .0172 .0233 .0152 .0227
Age of Chmn. Mean 58.4 58.7 57.1 58.5 55.3
Median 59 57 58 57 57.5
Dollar Value of Mean 40.05 83.75 9.22 60.79 11.23
Top Officers Stake
(in millions) Median 2.26 6.02 .795 4.22 1.11TABLE is: T-Statistics for Testsof Equality of Means of
TopManagement Variables by Acquisition Type
Friendly Hostile
FriendlyHostileNon-MEDNon-MEDFriendly Friendly Non-laO vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
SanoleSanle SaDie SamoleHostile Hostile Non-MO
FoundingFamily 2.55 -2.23 2.37 -2.06 3.33 3.12 Presenton Top
Management Team —1
Fractional Equity 4.42 -1.11 3.03 -.811 3.28 2.26
Ownership By The
Boardof Directors
Fractional Equity4.20 -1.56 3.45 -1.18 3.33 2.55
Ownership By Top
Two Officers
Fractional Equity1.27 .415 .0611 .358 .559 -.23
Ownership By The
Rest of the Board
Ageof Chmn. .217 -1.13 .0481 -2.28 .742 1.34
Dollar Value of 1.55 -1.25 .667 -1.04 2.03 1.60
Top Officers' Stake
(inmillions)10
ownershipthan the whole sample, although this difference is not
statistically significant. The higher board ownership of friendly targets
comes from higher ownership of the top officers. In fact, stakes of outside
board members do not seem to be much different from either those in hostile
targets or in the whole sample. At the 15% confidence level, hostile targets
seem to have lower top officer ownership than does an average firm. The
difference in officer positions is even more dramatic if one looks at dollar
values of the stake, where the average for a friendly target is twice that
for the sample as a whole, and nine times that for a hostile target. All
these results come through in the medians as well, although not as
dramatically.
Theincidence of the presence of a founder is also very high in friendly
targets, showing up as an impressive 40%. This is statistically
significantly higher than the 24% average for the sample as a whole and the
10%average for hostile targets. The incidence of the presence of a founder
in hostile targets is low relative to the sample, with a t-statistic of
-2.23. There does not seem to be any significant difference in the age of
the chairman or in the outside board ownership betweenthe whole sample and
friendlyand hostile targets. However, when MBOs are not classified as
acquisitions, we find that the chairmen of hostile targets are slightly
younger than the average chairman in the sample, perhaps suggesting that the
younger managers are more likely to strike a favorable deal with a white
knight or fight harder to remain independent,while the older managers more
often relyon the MBO as a takeover defense.
Before interpreting these results, we should explicitly acknowledge that
the means we compute are only intended to be suggestive, since in their11
calculation we do not control for important differences between firms. For
example, firmswithvery small ownership are larger firiis that are less
likelyto be acquired. Without a multivariate anatysis, some of the
correlations we describe might be spurious. We deal with these issues in
Section 4, but meanwhile proceed as if the evidence was indicative of the
causal relationship between ownership and takeovers.
One interpretation of the results presented so far is thatmanagement
teams with strong financial incentives to accept a tender offer ata premium
do not resist. This is supported by the fact that boards offriendly targets
have higher stakes and boards of hostile targets have lower stakes thanthe
sample average. Moreover, the entire difference is basically accounted for
by differential ownership of the top officers. Since officers have more to
lose as a result of an acquisition than do other board members,looking at
top officers rather than whole boards may be more powerful in explaining the
adopted resistance strategy.
An alternative interpretation of the findings on friendly offers is that
management teams with very large ownership have close to a veto power over
the outcome of the bid, and that therefore the onlyacquisitions with large
management ownership we observe are friendly. This is corroborated by the
fact that firms where founders are present are more likely to be thetargets
of friendly bids, since founders might have astronger preference for control
as well as a better ability to resist. The two interpretations arenot, of
course, incompatible. Companies might be targets of friendly offers both
because managers have a large incentive to succumb and because ifthey chose
not to. the offer could not succeed.
The latter view suggests that a number of would-be hostile offers endup12
as friendly offers because of the necessity to bribe entrenched managers. It
does not, however, explain a higher incidence of total acquisitions among
high ownership firms that we find in the data, table 2k presents the numbers
and probabilities of various types of acquisitions for firms with special
ownership structures, and Table 2B provides some hypothesis tests. Table 2k
shows that, whereas the probability of a non-MBO acquisition within five
years is 14.5% in the sample, it is 19.7% if the officer stake exceeds 15%.
If tthOsareincluded, the probability that a firmwithover 15% officer
ownership gets acquired exceeds that for a firm with under15%ownership by
11%, with a t-statistic of 2.11. That large stakes invite bids suggests that
the managers' incentive to sell is probably an operative factor in the
observed pattern of takeover activity.
The reason why companies with very large officer ownership have a higher
likelihood of being acquired is that they have a much higher likelihood of a
friendly bid. The probability that a firmwithat least 15% top officer
ownership was acquired in a friendly non-NBO transaction is 15.2% versus 6.2%
for firms with officer ownership below 15%. This difference between high and
tow ownership firms is significant at the 1% level (t—2.57). On the other
hand, the probability of a non-MED acquisition initiated in a hostile manner
is 4.5% for high ownership firms versus 7.4% for firms with less than 15% top
officer ownership, wbich is not statistically significant.
These results suggest the possibility that the ownership structure of
some firms makes them especially attractive targets of friendly takeovers.
For example, if a top officer with a large equity stake wants to retire and
simultaneously take some of his wealth out of the firm, he would probably
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 2B: Differences Between Acquisition Probabilities For
Various Ownership Categories. T-Statistics for Tests
of EquaLity of Acquisition Probabilities in Parentheses
All Non-MBO
Acauisitions Acquisitions
Probabilityof -Probabilityof -.0690 -.0575
Hostile Acquisition Hostile Acquisition (-2.23) (-2.06)
Founder —1 Founder —0
Probability of
-Probabilityof .0803 .0678
Friendly Acquisition Friendly Acquisition (2.55) (2.37)
Founder —1 Founder —0
Probability of -Probabilityof .0114 .0103
My Acquisition Any Acquisition (.270) (.27)
Founder —1 Founder —0
Probability of -Probabilityof -.0499 -.0293
Hostile Acquisition Hostile Acquisition (-1.32) (-.858)
OFF > .15 0FF S .15
Probability of -Probabilityof .1571 .0896
Friendly Acquisition Friendly Acquisition (4.16) (2.57)
OFF > .15 0FF S .15
Probability of -Probabilityof .1078 .0604
Any Acquisition Any Acquisition (2.11) (1.29)
OFF > .15 OFFS .1513
option of selling his shares on the open market. Life-cycle decisions of the
officers might provide a stimulus for friendly bids.
Further evidence on this point comes from the results on founders.
Table 2A shows that the probability ofany acquisition of a firm run by the
founding family is not much different from that of an averagecompany in the
sample. The likelihood of a friendly bid, however, is much higher for
founders' firms, and that of a hostile bid is much lower. For the entire
sample, the probability of a hostile non-MBO acquisition is 7.0% and the
probability of a friendly non-MBO acquisition is 7.5%. For firms run by
founding families, in contrast the likelihood of a friendly bid is 12.6% and
that of a hostile bid is 2.7%. The probability of a friendly bid is
statistically significantly higher for firms with founding families than for
firms without (t—2.37), and the probability of a hostile bid issignificantly
lower (t—-2.06). If founders can effectively deter hostile bids, and endup
selling their firms when they intend to leave the business, such results
might be expected.
A final piece of statistical evidence that corroborates thetop
management exit story concerns the age of the chairman. While the average
chairman in our sample is 58.4 years old, and theaverage chairman of a firm
witha founding family at the helm is 59.7•theaverage chairman in firms
thatare run by the founding family are sold to a friendly acquiror is
62.6 years old. These findings are consistent with the notion that founders
selling off their finns before retirement should on average be older.
Ax examination of the stories of individual companies confirms the
statistical evidence. A coimnon story Ce.g.,ABC,BecaoanInstruments, Clark
Oil, and others) is an elderly founder wishing to sell the business before he14
retires. In fact, of the fourteen founder firms that were acquired by another
party in a friendly transaction, one was the case of bankruptcy, one of need
to get money to pay inheritance taxes, one of a super-manager merging into a
larger firm to get a bigger job, and the rest of founders or of their
families wishing to get out.
If an important part of friendly acquisitions is just a personal hf e-
cycle decision of top management, then it is natural to ask how can high
takeover premia be paid in such transactions. One possibility is
mismanagement under the founder's reign; e.g., insufficient risk-taking,
insufficient expansion in order to maintain high fractional equity ownership,
or just poor decision-making. In this case, the founder's exit is
accompanied by a disciplinary takeover. An alternative possibility is that
the takeover is synergistic, but that the desire of managers to run their own
show often precludes such cDuibinations. The founder's wish to get out
provides the impetus for realizing the already available gains. Some
evidence shedding light on these two possibilities is presented in Section 3.
3. Financial Characteristics of the Targets.
The financial motivation of target management is unlikely to be the only
factor entering into the decision to oppose a tender offer. Some
acquisitions might be done for reasons that management particularly dislikes,
such as its own replacement or the liquidation of the firm. In this section,
we pursue such possible heterogeneity of acquisition targets.
The starting point of our analysis is Tobin's Q. As the ratio of the
market value of the finn to the replacement cost of its tanRible assets,
Tobin's Q can be viewed as measuring the intangible assets of the firm.15
Thesemay include future growth opportunities, monopoly power, quality of
management, goodwill, rents appropriated away from unions, etc. Since we are
looking at the measured Q, this interpretation can be problematic. The
replacement cost of assets could be overstated, for example, if the firm
bought its assets a long time ago and their value depreciated significantly
due to technological progress, foreign competition, or other changes. In
these cases, the inflation-adjusted historical cost is a poor guide to the
true replacement cost, but a very low Q is probably still a reliable
indicator of a declining firm.
Alternatively, Q might just capture the mispricing by the stock market
of the firm's physical assets in their current use. If, however, a low Q
genuinely measures the low valuation of tangible assets in their current use,
it may pay to sell off assets when Q is low because those assets have a
higher value in another firm or sector. Even when the firm's capital is
highly firm- or sector-specific, it may pay to just abandon the unprofitable
capacity or insist on a reduction in union wages that were set under more
profitable conditions.
A related measure of profitability relative to the value of physical
assets is the deviation of a firm's Q from the average Q of its 3-digit SIC
codeindustry. The market mightattach low value to assets of the whole
industry,and it could attach an even lower value to the assets of a
particular firm within tbatindustry.If itdoesthe latter, then we must
lookat the firm's idiosyncratic characteristics, such as its management, as
a source of potential acquisition gains.
Tobin's Q can shed light on the hypothesis that hostile acquisitions are
essentially purchases of old physical assets that can be redeployed more16
profitably either from an efficiency or taxviewpoint.If a low Q reflects
low valuation of physical assets relative to their potential, then acquiring
this finn might be a cost-effective way to buy and redeploy its physical
capital. In the same vein, we look at the age of the firm, which might give
us an idea of the age of its capital. Apart from serving as an indicator of
a declining firm, the age of the capital stock is a proxy for the potential
for a step up in the basis from which this capital can be redepreciated.
From the tax viewpoint, acquiring older assets is more advantageous; Shlelfer
and Vishny (1986) show how such tax considerations can be important in t4BOs.
Since Tobin's Q might be mismeasured, we are also interested in other
potential measures of the firm's performance. In particular, we look at a
10-year growth rate of the firms labor force, GL. If Q and CL are
simultaneously low, we feel more confident in attributing low valuation to
past or current troubles rather than to mismeasurement or market mispricing.
In two effective papers, Michael Jensen (1986a, l986b) has proposed a
free cash flow theory of low stock market valuation of targets of hostile
takeovers. On his theory, because some firms waste shareholders' wealth on
unprofitable investments and managerial perquisites, eliminating this waste
can create shareholder value. An example of wasted free cash flows, proposed
by Jensen and by Jacobs (1986), is exploration activity in the oil industry
that did not slow down in the face of declining oil prices. Jensen suggests
that interest and dividend payments alleviate the problem of free cash flow.
In this regard, he points to the role of debt as a means to commit future
corporate revenues to being paid out.
Strictly speaking Jensen's theory requires controlling for a variety of
aspects of the firm's opportunity set to be properly tested. We nevertheless17
check what fraction of their earnings non-targets, hostile targets, and
friendlytargets allocate to dividends, interest payments and investment. The
question is whether higher payouts and lower investment preclude hostile
action.
Another important strand in the discussion of corporate acquisitions
argues that capital market imperfections can deter otherwise feasible
transactions. A firm with a large market value could be difficult to
acquire, especially without thecooperation ofits management, because
financial markets might be unable to supply the credit necessary for the
acquisition. This view attributes the lively hostile takeover activity of
the19&Os at least in part to the appearance of junk bond financing. Looking
at market values of acquired firms should thus enable us to appraise the
extent to which capital market imperfections matter. Not surprisingly, all.
types of targets have fewer assets and lower market values than do firms that
are not acquired, indicating that capital market imperfections might deter
some corporate control transactions. Because market value is correlated both
with Q and management ownership, we defer more discussion of this issue to
the multivariate analysis section.
The means andmedians of the variables ofinterest by the typeoffirm
are presented in Table 3A, with the t-tests of differences of means in Table
38. Recall that all the variables are measured at the beginning of 1980.
The average Q of the sample is .848, which is the standard result of the low
valuation of corporate assets by the stock market in 1980. The average
Tobin's Q of a friendly target is .796, whichisnot significantly below the
sample average. In contrast, the average tobins Q of a hostile target is




Q Mean .848 .796 .524 .774 .545
Median .645 .617 .452 .624 .461
Q-Industry Q Mean 0 .0163 -.113 -.0368 -.119
Median -.0304 -.0662 -.112 -.0794 -.115
Replacement Cost Mean 2772.6 1372.0 1947.5 1534.6 2237.1
Median 1055 747.7 791.4 843.1 960.6
Growth Rate of Mean .0272 .0258 .0137 .0270 .0140
Labor Force Median .0199 .0183 .00948 .0232 .00948
Year of Incorporation Mean 1918.3 1924.6 1911.9 1924.6 1914.9
Median 1920 1925 1913 1925 1916
Total Market Value Mean 2092.6 969.8 1009.1 1028.4 1181.1
Median 808.2 683.2 384.2 732.0 387.8
Investment/Income Mean .704 .651 .576 .687 .588
Median .640 .522 .579 .629 .609
Dividends/Income Mean .183 .158 .178 .162 .176
Median .175 .151 .176 .151 .172
Interest/Income Mean .193 .246 .219 .254 .232
Median .175 .261 .211 .269 .223
Value of Mean .248 .285 .330 .269 .335
Long-Term/Total Median .208 .228 .267 .213 .299
Debt Market ValueTABLE 35: T-Statistics For Tots of Equality of Means of
Asset and Financial Variables by Acquisition Type
Friendly Hostile
FriendlyHostile Non-MW Non-MW HostileHostile Non-MW
vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
Snole SamoleSamoleSamole FriendlyFriendly Ron-MBO
Q
-.360 -2.84-.664 -2.36 -2.66 -2.19
Q-Industry Q .163 -1.43 -.337 -1.34 -1.72 -1.39
Replacement Cost-1.13 -.840 -.914 -.485 .641 .656
Growth Rate of -.148 -1.54 -.0191-1.37 -1.02 -.985
LaborForce
Year of 1.97 -1.92 1.78 -.922 -2.78 -2.02
Incorporation
Total Mkt. Value -1.19 -1.46 -1.04 -1.09 .0866 .285
Investment/Income -.701 -1.86 -.204 -1.57 -.818 -.96
Dividends/Income-1.26 -.318 -.938 -.354 .966 .624
Interest/Income 2.07 1.14 2.18 1.56 -.804 -.622




Unfortunately, a variety of interpretations are consistent with this
result. The first possibility is that hostile targets are mismanaged and
therefore have low Tobin's Qs. The result of such mismanagement is the
inefficient utilization of the fixed assets of the firm, and the resulting
low valuation of these assets by the market. Removing such management might
Justify the takeover premium, although the managers would probably resist
since they do not want to lose control or to have their incompetence
revealed. Managers of friendly targets, in contrast, are safe, and do not
need to worry about being removed.
Mismanagementcan come in two forms.It can be a firm-specific or an
industry-widephenomenon. In the former case, what should matter for
hostility is the extentby which the firm underperforms similar firms. To
some extent, this difference is measuredby Q
-IndustryQ.Infact, the
meanof Q -IndustryQ is positive for friendly targets and negative for
hostile ones, with the difference significant at the 10% level (t—l.72). On
the other hand, the differences are much smaller in the medians. To ascertain
whether the industry or the firm effect is more important in predicting
hostile activity, the next section presents some probits.
An alternative interpretation of extremely low Tobin Qs of hostile firms
is that, while the assets are managed properly, they simply are not
particularly valuable. For example, if hostile targets have invested a long
time ago when their industry was growing, but now the fortunes of their
industry have turned around, they will be stuck with a lot of capital. Under
this scenario, hostile targets might be smokestacks ruined by technological
progress and foreign competition.19
Consistent with this view, hostile targets are older and slower growing
than the average firm in the sample. The difference inyear of incorporation
between hostile targets and other firms is over sixyears, and is significant
at the 6% level. The difference in the growth rates of the labor force is
1.4% (or almost twofold), which is significant at the 12% level.Friendly
targets, in contrast, are younger than the average firm and are growing at
roughlythe same rate.
Although this view suggests why firms with a lot of old fixed capital
would have low Qs, it does not explain why these firmsare attractive
candidates for hostile acquisitions. One explanation is the free cash flow
theory. If low Q industries are in decline, managers may be too slow to
close down or sell-off plants1 abort investment, and trim down operations.
There is some evidence that hostile targets are investing a smaller fraction
of earnings than the average firm in the sample (t—-l.86).
If managers' dedication to the survival of organizations, stressedby
Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), keeps them from shrinking their operations
sufficiently fast, then acquirors can increase value by speeding up the
declineof the target company.Our numberson growth of the labor force,
incorporation year. investment, and Qareall consistent with the version of
the free cash flowtheory that stresses management's tendency to disinvest
too slowly.
Another reason why old tangible assets could attract acquirors has to do
with taxes. An important feature of the (old) US tax code isthe General
Utilitiesdoctrine, according to which if a firm's assets are sold in a
liquidation, then capital gains taxes can be avoided at the corporate level.
After such an acquisition, the target's assets can be redepreciated,20
presumably using the accelerated schedules of the 1980's. The step-up in
basis could have been an important tax motivation for acquiring old capital.
In addition of course, there are tax gains in acquisitions due to leverage.
While these apply equally to firms without too much fixed capital, it may be
more costly for such firms to obtain debt financing. If managers oppose a
loss of control to an acquiror, they can lever up and step up the basis by
doing an IthO or finding a white knight. These in fact have been common
responses to hostile pressure.
One final explanation for hostile offers that is consistent with our
findings is underpricing by the market. If the stock market does not value
some firms properly, an acquiror who understands their intrinsic value may be
able to buy assets more cheaply on the stock market than on the new or used
capital goods market. Managers reluctant to give up assets at below their
intrinsic worth would resist such acquisitions. One problem with this
explanation of hostile bids is that it says nothing as to why older, slower
growing companies with mostly tangible assets are the only ones undervalued
on the stock market. Moreover, since once a company is in play the corporate
control market becomes very competitive and a lot of information is revealed,
there definitely are limitations on the ability of acquirors to profit in
this way.
In summary, hostile targets appear to have sharply distinguishable asset
characteristics. Relative to the market value of the firm, they appear to
have a lot of old tangible capital. They are growing slowly and have a lot
of debt. While this suggests that hostile acquisitions might be related to
the desire to purchase these fixed assets, there are a variety of
explanations consistent with this general story. In particular, incompetent21
management,asset redeployment, free cash flow, taxes and underpricing of the
firm's assets by the marketcouldall invite takeover bids. At the same
time,wethink that the evidence is supportive of the notion that hostile
takeovers are motivated by the need of disciplinary actionagainst the target
management.
Theanalysis of this section said virtually nothing about the targets of
friendly bids. Except for the fact that they are on average smaller and six
years younger than the rest of the sample (t-statistics of -1.13 and -1.97
respectively), friendly targets are very similar to the average firm in the
sample. Most notably, their Q is not statistically or substantively
different from that of the average fins in the sample, and issignificantly
higher than Q of an average hostile target (t—2.66). In a sense, this is
consistent with the view that friendly targets are just regular firms, and
their acquisition derives from some idiosyncratic circumstances suchas a
life cycle decision of a top officer with a large stake, ora match-specific
synergy ( e.g. •thedesire ofthe acquiring management to enter a particular
newbusiness). One interesting feature of friendly targets is that they
appear to have higher interest payouts and lower dividend payouts than an
averagefirmin the sample,perhaps indicating that they are starved for
capital. Their total outside payouts are verysimilar to thoseof an average
firm.
The results of this section provide the basic evidence insupport of the
notion that disciplinary takeovers are more often hostile, whilesynergistic
takeovers are more often friendly. The evidence indicates that hostile
targetsare older, poorly performing firms, possibly with a lot of old plants
or equipment that should be abandoned or more profitably deployed elsewhere.22
Thisis exactly what one would expect of targets of disciplinarytakeovers.
Incontrast, financial characteristics of friendly targets do notappearto
be very different from those of an average firm in the sample. If what
attracts acquirors to such targets are match-specific synergies (as well as
the target manager's interest in selling), we would not expectto see any
realdifferences in the basic financial variables. In short, the results
suggest that the motive for a takeover might well determine its mood.
Treating hostile and friendly acquisitions as reflecting the same underlying
fundamentalsmight be verymisleading indeed.
4.Probits.
Theprevious section has offered evidence suggesting that the motives
for hostile and friendly acquisitions might be different. In this section,
weperform some further statistical tests of what makes a firm the target of
a friendly takeover and what makes a firm the target of a hostile takeover.
This is different from asking what makes the mood of a takeover of an already
selected target hostile or friendly, since the latter question presumes that
characteristics that make firms targets in the first place are the same
acrossmoods. If hostile and friendly takeovers typically reflect different
motives, it is misleading to think of a firm becoming a general target.
Rather,separate considerations are appropriate for predicting which firms
are subject to hostile (i.e., disciplinary) takeovers and which are subject
to friendly (i.e., synergistic) ones.
Accordingly, this section presents probits estimated on the whole sample
of 1980 Fortune 500 firms, that separately predict hostile and friendly
acquisitions. The models are either prob(hostile vs anything else) —23
f(characteristics), or prob(friendly vs anything else) —g(characteristics).
In short, weseparatelycompare hostile and friendly targets to the rest of
theFortune 500 sample.
We do a multivariate analysis because many of thecompany
characteristicswe look at are correlated with each other. For example, the
growth rate of the finn's labor force is so closely correlated with Q that it
becomes dominated by Q in the regressions. While we have run several
additional probits to identify the separate sources of influence of firm
characteristics on the probability of a friendly acquisition and the
probability of a hostile acquisition, the results presented below reflect our
main findings.
Table 4A presents the four probits estimating the likelihood that a
Fortune 500 firm goes through a successful friendly acquisition.Mimicking
ourearlier finding that friendly targets are just like the sample as a
whole, the probits do not reveal particularly strong correlations.
Specifically,the probability of a friendly acquisition is not clearly
related to the log of the firm's market value, the presence of a founder,or
Tobin's Q. That high market value does not deter friendly acquisitions is
inconsistentwith the preliminary indications from Table 3A. This could be
because size is negatively correlated with officerownership which is, in
turn, positively related tofriendly bids. In this case, the finding in Table
3Ais spurious. Given that friendly bids are often made by large, cash-rich
companies and sometimes for stock, it is not entirely surprising that capital
market constraints are not particularly binding.
When friendly laOs are included among acquired firms, there is some
evidence that large officer ownership promotes friendly acquisitions. ThisTABLE 4k:Probit Regressions of Friendly Acquisition







Intercept -1.33 -1.29 -1.57 -1.60
(-1.81) (-1.70) (-1.86) (-1.90)
Log of Total -.0583 -.0632 -.0195 -.0213
Market Value (-.490) (-.561) (-.150) (-.170)
Founding Family -.130 -.129 -.155 -.162
Present —1 (-.339) (-.337) (-.361) (-.373)
Proportion of 1.54 1.51 1.18 1.20






Number of Firms 371 371 371 371
inRegression
Note:t-statistics in parentheses24
result gets weaker when NBOs are excluded, since, as we show in the next
section,firmsgoing through friendly MBOs often have dominant management
ownership. We should also point out, however, that the ownership results are
generallyweaker inthe probits than in the earlier tables,because we lose a
substantial number of observations due to missing values for Q. Wehave Q
for only 20 friendly targets and 31 hostile targets.
The result that as far as assets and performance go, friendly targets
are Just like other firms, is confirmed using both Q and Q -IndustryQ.
Neither Q nor Q -IndustryQ mattered for predicting friendly acquisitions.
These negative results are consistent with the notion that friendly takeovers
aremotivated by synergy.
The story is very different with hostile acquisitions, the probits for
whichare presented in Table 4B. For the sample including hostile MBOs, the
likelihood of a hostile acquisition is negatively related to the log of
value, negatively related to Q, and negatively related (at the 15% confidence
level) to the presence of a founder. Surprisingly, the negative effect of
officer ownership on the probability of a hostile acquisition is not
statisticallysignificant.
Theresult that, controlling for Q' high market value deters hostile
acquisitions, seems likely to reflect capital market imperfections. It
suggests that some firms are too large to be acquired through a hostile bid,
even when fundamentals dictate that they should be. This result becomes
substantially weaker when hostile MBOs are excluded from the sample of
hostile targets, since these are very small firms. In fact, MZOs are
probably the best case for the argument that poor capital markets limit large
transactions.The results in Table 4B also confirm our earlier finding thatTABLE 43: Probit tegrsssions of Hostils Acquisition
Dummies on Otmsrship and Financial Variable.
Dependent Variable







Intercept .506 .511 -.123 -.147
(.864) (.882) (-.195) (-.231)
LogofTotal -.182 -.269 -.115 -.188
Market Value (-1.91) (-3.11) (-1.17) (-2.03)
FoundingFamily -.751 -.748 -.606 -.623
Present—1 (-1.56) (-1.72) (-1.28) (-1.46)
Proportionof -1.31 -1.29 -.878 -.843




Q-Industry Q - .219 -.268
(-.492) (-.557)
Number of Firms 371 371 371 371
in Regression
Note: t-statistics in parentheses25
hostile targets have low market valuations relative to tangible assets, and
that the presence of a founder discourages hostile action, holdint officer
stake azid valuation constant. This suggests that founders or their families
fight hostile bids more effectively, either because they value control more
orbecause they command shareholders' or directors' support.
One impørtant question that we could not answer by simply comparing
means is whether industry-specific or firm-specific components of Tobin's Q
are attracting hostile activity. In our estimated probits, Tobin's Q has a
significant negative effect on the likelihood of a hostile acquisition,
whereas Q -IndustryQ has an insignificant negative effect. The log
likelihoods for the two equations are also quite different, with the Q
equation higher by 3.37. Furthermore, when Q and Q -IndustryQ are
simultaneously included in the probit, Q remains significant while
Q -IndustryQ hardly has any additional effect on the probability of a
hostile acqusition. It appears that industry-specific rather than firm
specific problems attract hostile bids.
Viewed in the context of the mismanagement story, this finding says that
hostile activity is stimulated by industry wide and not company specific
mismanagement. For example, it would suggest that the whole oil industry
fell into the exploration trap, and not so much that Gulf Oil was a
particularly overzealous explorer. The finding that, in predicting hostile
action, Q matters while Q -IndustryQ does not, may indicate the existence
of entire industries whose assets can be profitably redeployed either for
efficiency or tax reasons. As further examples, many steel and textile firms
might be in need of shutdowns and selloffs that do violence to the
preferences of existing managers. Such managers are not necessarily Just26
trying to shirk or save empires. They may just be opposed to changes that
enrich shareholders at the expense of employees. The point is that hostile
acquisitions can be a way to move large quantities of fixed capital into more
profitable (and possibly also more productive) uses, as one would expect of
disciplinary takeovers.
While the statistical evidence is fairly weak, it is consistent with our
observation that the motive for friendly acquisitions is more likely to be
synergistic whereas for hostile ones it is more likely to be disciplinary.
Specifically, friendly acquisitions seem to be related to high officer
ownership, which suggests that an important impetus for such acquisitions
might be a life-cycle decision of a large shareholder. Furthermore, all
other basic firm characteristics we have looked at appear to be irrelevant
for predicting friendly acquisitions. We might expect this of synergistic or
diversification-oriented takeovers. Hostile bids, in contrast, seem to be
targeted at firms located in low Qindustries.One interpretation of the low
Qfindingis that hostile acquisitions are a way to redeploy tangible assets
in a more profitable way. Many of these redeployments can either be
unacceptable to managers (e.g., liquidation, employee dismissals), or can be
more painlessly replicated by a white knight or in an 1(50 (e.g.,step-up in
depreciable basis, increases in leverage). This, of course, is the story of
the disciplinary motive for hostile takeovers.
5. Management Buyouts.
Management buyouts are important to think about since we know that the
motive behind them cannot be synergistic. Whatever gains realized by MEO
organizers must come eitber from a more profitable exploitation of the fino's27
own resources,including its managerial talent, or from the ability of
organizers to buy the firm's assets for less than their intrinsic worth under
the existing operating strategy.
Schipper and Smith (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1986). and Kaplan (1987)
discuss the sources of gains in management buyouts. All of these authors
found that taxconsiderations,especially leveraging up and step up in the
basis, could justify a large part of the takeover premium. Kaplan estimates
that80% of the takeover preuitwn can come from the tax savings. Other
important candidates for the source of gains include buying underpriced
assets, improved incentives from higtter management ownership and leverage,
andthe restructuring of declining companies along the lines sought by
raiders.
Hence, it is important to distinguish between two types of management
buyouts. The first are the buyouts that respond to hostile pressure on the
target's management. Such pressure can either take the form of An outside
bid, or simply of an acquisition of a beachhead along with a 13-D filing to
theeffect that control might besought. The fact thatmanagersand their
investmentbanker partners can win the bidding for the finn in such
situationssuggests that the gains fromanacquisition can be realized by
them as well as by outside bidders. If these gains come from taxsavingsor
buying underpriced assets, this result is not surprising. But it also seems
likely that after an I4BO managers redeploy the target's assets in better
uses. Managers mayhavebeen unwilling to implement these changes before
being forced to make a defensive bid for the firm at a large premium.
Besides these hostile management buyouts, there are transactions
initiated by the management without any apparent outsidethreat. We call28
them friendly $JOs. One of the motives for friendly MBOs may be the exit
story we developed for friendly deals more generally. In this case, the MW
can be a way for a dominant CEO to pass the leadership to the next generation
of managers withoutdissipatingcontrol. Another motive for friendly MBOs
may Just be to realize tax gains from leverage and stepping up the
depreciable basis of the firm's assets. While another oft-cited motive for
MEOs isto improve incentives through increased management ownership, this
seems less plausible for our sample of friendly MBOs given that management
ownership is already quite high.
A final motive for friendly MEOs that may be inportant, is for
management to buy the share of the firm's assets they do not already own for
less than its true value (either under the existing operating strategy or
undera new one). Of course, this story requires that management have some
ability to freeze out minority shareholders once it takes over, so that it
can get shareholders to tender for less than the true value of their shares.
Also, the story presumes that competitive bidding from third parties willnot
drivethe profit from this strategy to zero. But both of these requirements
seem likely to be met in manycases where managers have much better
informationthan outsiders about the true value of the firm and management
already owns a good deal of the stock (as in our sample of friendly MBOs).
Ofthesixteen MBOs in our sample of 82 acquisitions. Sarehostile in
the sense described above and the other 8 are friendly. Table Spresents
ownershipand financial characteristics oftheseMEOs. Comparing this table
withTables là and 3A, we see that hostile fiGs share many of the features of
other hostile transactions. They have very low Qs, low growth rates, low
investment, large amounts of debt, and relatively low board and officerTABLE 5:Ownershipand Financial Characteristics
forManagement Buyouts
Samole Friendly NW Hostile MBO
Founding Family Present .244 .375 .125
Present On top
Management Team —1
Fractional Equity .0636 .170 .0135
Ownership By Top
Two Officers
Fractional Equity .0454 .131 .0517
Ownership By The
Rest of the Board
Ageof Cbinn. 58.4 59.8 62.5
Q .848 .916 .436
Q-Industry Q 0 .318 -.0873
Replacement Cost 2772.6 450.3 740.5
Growth Rate of .0272 .0205 .0119
Labor Force
Year of Incorporation 1918.3 1924.3 1898.4
Total Market Value 2092.6 638.1 292.1
Investment/Income .704 .456 .499
Dividends/Income .183 .136 .185
Interest/Income .193 .204 .135
Value of
Long-Term/total Market .248 .373 .310
Debt Value29
ownership. The average year of incorporation for a hostile MBO target is a
strikingly low 1898. These companies are much smaller than run of the mill
hostile targets, and have lower incidence of a founder's presence. Our
examinationof particular instances of hostile MBOs confirms the observation
thatthey are often acquisitions of old tangible assets, that can be
subsequently redeployed more profitably or redepreciated. The picture of
hostile MBOs that emerges is consistent with their being a defensive response
to the threat of a disciplinary takeover.
Friendly MBOs are a very different type of transaction, and it is much
less clear how they compare with other friendly deals. Friendly ZIBOs are
management-initiated deals that are not foiled by higher third party bids.
Not surprisingly, 37.5% of these firms are run by the founding family, and
the average pre-PthO board stake is over 30%.
Given that officers in friendly MBOs often have virtually complete
cQntrol of the company, their motives for the transaction maybesuspect.
Purchasing undervalued shares in the presence of coercion and disadvantaged
competitive bidders seems like a distinct possibility. Consider two cases in
our sample. One isan 1430 of Metromediaat a 100% premium, which was
followedby the saleof the parts of the company (previously dictatorially
run by the same boss for 30 years) for more than double the acquisition price
within 18 months. Another is the MBO of Beatrice foods, followed by the sale
of several divisions that paid for the whole acquisition (Beatrice, however,
did not have dominant insider ownership). There are other companies where
management initiated an MB0 when its voting control was already effectively
absolute, such as Levi-Strauss and Questor.
In sum, while we do not have a clear idea of how friendly MBOs relate to30
other friendly acquisitions, our consolidation of hostile l1EOs with other
hostile acquisitions does not seem to do too much violence to the data.
Firms going through MBOs in response to hostile threats resemble other
hostile targets quite closely. In fact, we can use our kiiowledge of hostile
MBOs to make inferences about hostile takeovers more generally.
6. Concluding Comments.
The notion developed in this paper is that the motive for a takeover can
have a large influence on its mood. Disciplinary takeovers are more likely
to be hostile, whereas synergistic takeovers are more likely to be friendly.
Compared to the universe of Fortune 500 firms, hostile targets are
smaller,older, more slowly growing,have lower 'lobin's Qs, more debt, and
invest less of their income. The low Qseemsto be an industry specific
rather than a firmspecificeffect. In addition, hostile targets are less
likelyto be run bythe founding family, and have lower officer ownership,
thanthe average firm. Low Q,lowmarket value, low growth and investment,
andthe absence of a founderare the characteristics of a firm thatare most
likely to makeitthe target ofa hostile bid.
Comparedto the universe of Fortune 500 firms, friendly targets are
smaller and younger, buthavecomparable Tobin's Qs and growthrates.
Friendlytargets are more likely to be run by a member of the founding
family, andhavehigher officer ownership, than the average firm.The
decision of a CEO with a large stake and/or with a relationship to the
founderto retire often precipitates a friendly acquisition. High officer
ownership is the most important attribute in predicting friendly
acquisitions.31
We conclude that differences between synergistic anddisciplinary
takeovers, captured in part by differences in their moods,shouldbe
recognized in empirical work. Specifically, studies that fail to adequately
distinguish acquisitions with different motives can be misleading. First,
difficulties can arise when disciplinary and synergistic takeovers are
analyzedtogether, presenting the researcher with a mix that may have few
canon characteristics. Our results suggest that, as a first cut, separating
hostile and friendly takeovers can help deal with this problem. A second
difficulty can occur when facts about one type of acquisition are used to
draw inferences about another. An example of a good study that could be
misread is Brown and Medoff's 1987 paper. The authors find that in a large
sample of small Michigan companies, employment and wages rise after they are
acquired. Since most of their sample seems to consist of friendly
acquisitions of very small firms with high management ownership, one cannot
conclude from their work that employment and wages do not fall on average
after a firm is acquired in a disciplinary takeover. To get at the latter
question, one would have to look at hostile targets. A key implication of
our study for future work, therefore, is that results for friendly bids may
have little to say about hostile bids, and vice versa.32
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